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ABSTRACT
Previous research has found a high level of interdependence among national
stock markets. This study investigates whether traders in the new Nikkei
futures contracts can profit from these interactions by following the
performance in the U.S. equity market. As expected, the U.S. return has a
great impact on the overnight futures return. However, some evidence of
overreaction exists as the open to close futures return tends to be inversely
related to the U.S. return, particularly after a large increase in U.S. equity
markets
.
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DO THE NIKKEI STOCK INDEX FUTURES FOLLOWS THE S&P 500?
A WEAK FORM EFFICIENCY TEST
Research on international equity market linkages has discovered a
high degree of interdependence among national stock markets. Jaffe
and Westerfield (1985a), Schollhammer and Sand (1985), and Eun and
Shim (1989) employed daily market closing data for several countries
and found that linkages between stock markets were substantial.
Recent papers [Bennett and Kelleher (1988), Dwyer and Hafer
(1988), Goodhart (1988), King and Wadhwani (1988), Neuraark, Tinsley,
and Tosini (1988), and Roll (1988)] investigated international equity
market linkages around the October 1987 crash. The papers generally
discovered strong cross-exchange linkages after the crash.
Becker, Finnerty, and Gupta (1989) found that, for a recent time
period, the U.S. equity market greatly influenced Japanese equity
returns. For example, correlations between lagged S&P 500 open to
close returns and open to close Nikkei Index returns were between .26
2
and .49. In addition, large movements in the U.S. predicted market
changes in Japan remarkably well. Trading rules were set up in which
a trader in Japan buys or sells at the open price, depending on the
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performance in the U.S. market, and closes the position at the end of
the day. When up filters were triggered, the Nikkei Index increased
3the next day 72% to 81% of the time. The down triggers selected
market decreases the next day with slightly less precision, 59% to
75%. 4
High correlations between the respective open to close returns are
a violation of the efficient market hypothesis because public infor-
mation about the performance in one market could be used to profitably
trade in another market. If the markets are efficient, information
about the open to close in one market (for example, the U.S. return
in period t-1) will be fully reflected in the open price in the other
market (Japan in period t). Since new information flows randomly into
the market, subsequent price changes should be random and the open to
close Japanese returns will be uncorrelated with the lagged U.S.
returns. Thus, the performance in the U.S. should affect the open
Nikkei price and the correlation between the open to close returns in
the two markets should be zero.
However, high trading costs in Japan may prevent arbitrageurs from
profiting from the high correlations. These trading costs, which are
5
over 1%, wipe out excess profits. However, traders with superior
knowledge about future price changes would use cheaper, levered,
futures contracts. Futures contracts on the Nikkei Index have been
traded on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) since
late 1986. The trading unit is 500 Japanese yen times the Nikkei
Index.
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This paper examines the intertemporal relation between the U.S.
market and the Nikkei futures. This paper has efficiency implications
since high correlations imply that investors can profit simply by
using the Nikkei futures to track the Japanese market, based on indi-
cations from the U.S. markets. As expected, the performance in the
U.S. has a great impact on the overnight return in Singapore. How-
ever, the results in this paper are in contrast to the results with
the S&P 500 and spot Nikkei Index. There is some evidence of over-
reaction in the futures markets, particularly after large increases in
the S&P 500; this is a violation of the efficient market hypothesis,
which implies that Bayes' rule determines the correct reply to new
information. In contrast, overreaction suggests that people emphasize
recent news and underweight prior information.
Overreaction has been documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in
the U.S. equity market and Stein (1989) in the options market. By
forming equally weighted portfolios of stocks that had extreme high
and low returns for the previous three years, DeBondt and Thaler find
that the loser portfolio of stocks significantly outperformed the
winner portfolio. The superior performance continues even up to 36
months after the original formulation. Their results suggest that
equity prices follow a reverting or correcting pattern because in-
vestors overreact to both positive and negative information.
By examining the implied standard deviations of long and short-
term options on the S&P 500, Stein found that the long-maturity op-
tions overreact to changes in the implied volatility of short-term
options. However, this effect is small in economic magnitude.
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In our case, the dramatic news is a large increase in the U.S.
market. The market participants overreact by opening the futures con-
tract price too high; therefore, subsequent daily returns will be
smaller as the market tries to correct itself.
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Daily opening and closing prices for the Nikkei Index futures are
obtained from Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbooks for 1987 and 1988.
Opening and closing values for the S&P 500 are also gathered for the
same period. To ensure that extreme returns during the crash are not
affecting the results, the crash period from October 19-30, 1987 is
o
deleted from the sample.
Futures prices are selected from the most active contract in a
9particular month, which occurs two to four months from expiration.
Daily arithmetic returns (using the opening and closing prices) are
calculated for the S&P 500 and Nikkei futures. There are 507 U.S. re-
turns and 498 Nikkei futures returns during this period. After the
returns are merged, 481 observations exist for the U.S. daily returns
leading the futures, and 467 observations for the U.S. impacting the
Nikkei overnight returns.
The trading unit of the futures contracts is 500 Japanese yen
times the Nikkei average. To put the futures and S&P 500 returns on a
common currency basis, the U.S. returns are converted to a yen equiva-
lent. Opening and closing dollar/yen exchange rates are obtained from
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbooks.
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Correlations are calculated for the lagged S&P 500 returns, in
both U.S. dollars and Japanese yen, and the Nikkei futures returns in
the current period. To investigate how the U.S. performance affects
the overnight futures return, the correlation is calculated between
the lagged daily U.S. return and the current futures open to previous
close return.
To analyze efficiency, a simulation is implemented in which a
trader buys Nikkei futures at the open price when the local S&P 500
increases by .5%, 1%, 1.5%, or 2% the previous day and sells when the
index decreases by the same percentages. The positions are closed at
the end of the day. Profitable trading days are counted along with
mean returns.
II. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the test of the U.S. leading the overnight re-
turns and Table 2 illustrates the affect on the subsequent daily
returns. The common and local currency results in Tables 1 and 2 are
similar. As expected, the U.S. daily return has a great impact on
the futures overnight return, with correlations between .60 and .63
for the lagged U.S. return and the Nikkei futures overnight return.
The slope coefficient is approximately .40.
Insert Table 1 Here
The fact that the U.S. return greatly influences the futures
overnight return is not surprising. Rather than examining all of the
individual pieces of news since the last SIMEX close and guessing how
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the information will affect the open price, the traders look to the
U.S. market for guidance. Goodhart (1988) states that this phenomenon
is likely to occur if market participants believe that overseas mar-
kets are better able to access information than the trader could do by
independently studying the effect of the news on share prices. Since
the U.S. equity market is one of the largest in the world, investors
are likely to trust the judgment of the market.
Consistent with market efficiency, the correlation between the
lagged U.S. return and the current futures return is not statistically
significant. However, an unexpected finding is that there is a nega-
tive relationship between the daily U.S. return and the futures per-
formance. The correlations, although not statistically significant
with a p-value of .13 for the local currency and .14 for the common
currency returns, are approximately -.07.
Insert Table 2 Here
Results from the trading simulation, presented in Table 3, suggest
that the futures market tends to overreact to large changes in the
U.S. market. After the S&P 500 decreases substantially, the futures
return the next day is substantial. For example, when the U.S. de-
creases by 1% or more, the mean open to close futures return is .191%,
with a median return of .231%. In addition, 68% of the futures
returns are up.
Insert Table 3 Here
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In contrast, the futures performance is below average after sub-
stantial increases in the U.S. Median returns and the percentage up
returns are below average, particularly for the 2% filter.
To determine if the mean of the futures returns after the filter
is statistically different from the overall mean, the data are split
up into two groups: the filter returns group and the rest of the
returns. Then a t-test for the difference between two means is cal-
culated.
The mean return after the 2% filter is statistically different
from the rest of the returns at a 5% level of significance. The mean
return of the filter is -.15% and the mean return for the other 454
returns is .07%.
The other mean filter returns are not statistically different from
the rest of the returns. This result is not surprising, considering
the lack of observations in the filter group. For example, there are
17 returns for the -2% trigger, for a mean futures return of .301%.
The remainder of the returns (464) have a mean return of .045%.
Although the mean for the filters are much higher, they are not sta-
tistically different because of lack of observations in the filter
group.
The futures market seems to overreact to the news of large market
movements in the U.S., particularly after increases. After a large
market increase in the U.S., the opening price in Singapore tends to
be too high. Subsequent changes are not independent of the U.S. per-
formance as the market corrects for the overreaction.
III. CONCLUSION
This study investigates whether traders in the new Nikkei futures
contracts can profit from high correlations between the U.S. equity
market and the Japanese market. Thus, this study has efficient market
implications because correlations between open to close returns of
countries with no overlap in trading should be zero.
As expected, the lagged U.S. return has a great impact on the
futures overnight return. Supporting market efficiency, the correla-
tion between the lagged S&P 500 returns and the open to close futures
returns is not statistically significant.
However, some evidence of overreaction exists as the open to close
futures return tends to be inversely related to the U.S. return, par-
ticularly after a large increase in U.S. equities. This finding is
consistent with the DeBondt and Thaler hypothesis that investors
overreact to dramatic news events. After a large increase in the U.S.
market, the open price in Singapore is too high and subsequent returns
are negatively related to the U.S. return.
However, evidence of overreaction is not overwhelming. Most of
the means of the filters are not statistically different from the
remainder of the returns, even though the difference in mean returns
is as high as .25%. The reason for the insignificance is a lack of
returns in the filter groups. For example, only 17 returns exist for
the -2% filter. More work needs to be done on this topic at a later
time when more data are available.
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NOTES
The Nikkei Index is a broadly based, price-weighted average of
225 large, actively traded Japanese stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The index is calculated by Nihon Keizai Shirabur (Japan
Economic Journal).
2
Because Tokyo is 14 hours ahead of New York, there is no overlap
between the two markets. Thus, the correlation between the lagged
U.S. daily return and the current return in Japan is a test of the
U.S. leading Japan. The correlation between the returns was much
higher (.49) when the crash month of October 1987 was included in the
sample. Without that month, the correlation was .26.
3
For examp-le, when the S&P 500 was up by 1% or more, the Nikkei
Index increased 78% of the time the next day for a mean daily return
of .507%. The 2% trigger predicted up returns for 76% of the trading
days, for a mean return of .73%.
4
After S&P 500 decreased by 1% or more, the Nikkei Index decreased
63% of the time the next trading day for a mean daily return of -.35%.
The 2% down trigger was successful at selecting down trading days with
75% precision, for a mean return of -.699%.
Trading costs are higher in Japan than in the U.S. For example,
one-way transactions costs for a 1 billion yen trade (approximately
$8 million) are .22%. In addition, the Japanese government imposes a
transfer tax on the seller. The tax varies between .18% to .55% of
the market value.
Interest in these contracts has increased substantially. In
early 1987, volume for the most active contract averaged around 1,000
contracts per day. In contrast, volume in late 1988 averaged approxi-
mately 3,000 contracts per day.
The spot and futures markets open at 9:00 a.m. Tokyo time. The
Tokyo Stock Exchange closes at 3:00 and the futures market closes at
3:15 Tokyo time.
Q
Volatility was extremely high during this period. Of the nine
deleted daily returns, eight had an absolute value greater than 2%.
The low return was -26.8% on October 20, and the high was 15.7% on
October 27.
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Futures prices are obtained from the following contracts:
MONTHS CONTRACT EXPIRATION
January, February 87
March, April, May 87
June, July, August 87
September, October, November 87
December 87, January, February 88
March, April, May 88
June, July, August 88
September, October, November 88
December 88
March 87
June 87
September 87
December 87
March 88
June 88
September 88
December 88
March 89
10.
When prices could not be obtained for a lagged or current trading
day due to a closed market in one country, the observation is deleted
from the sample. For example, assume that both markets are open
Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, with the Singapore market closed
Wednesday. For a test of the U.S. leading the daily futures returns,
observations are taken for Tuesday and Thursday. For the U.S. affect-
ing the overnight Singapore return, only the Monday close to Tuesday
open return is included. The Thursday close to open return is not
included because the last close occurred Tuesday.
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Table 1
Regression and Correlation Results
Lagged U.S. Daily Returns
Leading Nikkei Futures Overnight Returns
T Value in Parentheses
NIKKEI^"
" %S + eUS S<-l + £DS
Local Currency Common Currency
INTERCEPT (e )
U D
.0002
(0.98)
.0005*
(1.73)
S&P
t-~l 'W .3988***(17.39)
.3263***
(16.41)
F VALUE
R SQUARE
C0RR
302.37***
.3940
.6277***
269.25***
.3667
.6056***
*** Significant at a 1% level
** Significant at a 5% level
* Significant at a 10% level
Table 2
Regression and Correlation Results
Lagged U.S. Daily Returns
Leading Nikkei Futures Open to Close Returns
T Value in Parentheses
NIKKEI
o-c
°us
+ 8S&P
t-l
+
^us
Local Currency Common Currency
INTERCEPT (s ) .0006
(1.45)
.0006
(1.39)
*<A < eas ) -.0356(-1.51)
-.0439
(-1.45)
F VALUE
R SQUARE
C0RR
2.29
.0048
-.069
2.10
.0044
-.066
*** Significant at a 1% level
** Significant at a 5% level
* Significant at a 10% level
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Nikkei Futures Returns in Day t
After Local Return S&P 500 Filter in Day t-1
FILTER MEAN MEDIAN UP DOWN UNCH %UP
-.5% .143% .173% 63 40 3 59%
-1% .191% .231% 43 19 1 68%
-1.5% .095% .302% 23 12 1 64%
-1% .302% .310% 12 4 1 71%
.5% .025% .000 75 70 6 50%
1% .077% .040% 45 35 3 54%
1.5% .075% .038% 25 21 1 53%
2% -.155%** -.129% 11 16 41%
ENTIRE .054% .078% 268 198 15 56%
DATA
*** Significant at a 1% level
** Significant at a 5% level
* Significant at a 10% level



